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 Summary and Conclusions 
 
The purpose of the review was to identify and assess a range of innovative instruments for 
financing and/or covering the costs of policy action on invasive alien species (IAS). The 
analysis focused on IAS instruments financed through private funding. In addition, examples 
of cost-effective ways to combine public and private funding were identified.  
 
The overall aim of this work was to support the future implementation of Finnish national 
IAS strategy, adopted in 20121. It was carried out in the context of a broader project on 
increasing knowledge on IAS in Finland (e.g. distribution, dispersal, risk management and 
pathways for entry)2. The project, supported by IEEP, was led by the Finnish Environment 
Institute (SYKE) and financed by the Finnish Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.  
 
Ten instruments were identified and assessed in the context of the study. The selection was 
based on the researchers' expert knowledge as well as a call for examples to the 
international experts of the IUCN Invasive Species Specialist Group (ISSG). The selection of 
examples was aimed to be illustrative only and it was not intended to produce a 
comprehensive overview of all existing instruments for financing or covering the costs policy 
action on IAS. 
 
The identified instruments were systematically assessed (see below) and their possible 
applicability in Finland was estimated. Six criteria were used to evaluate the identified 
instruments: 
1. Coverage and scope (type of IAS, phase of invasion etc.) 
2. Cost-effectiveness (covering costs of action, reducing the risk of IAS) 
3. Legal requirements 
4. Administrative burden 
5. Requirements for public funding 
6. Acceptability and legitimacy 
An overview of the identified instruments is presented in Table 1 and detailed assessments 
are available in Chapters 1-10.  
 
In general, the assessment of identified instruments shows that the majority of the available 
innovative instruments for financing and/or covering the costs of action on IAS are suitable 
for deployment in Finland. Several instruments, such as cost recovery due to non-
compliance, payments and fines based on liability, and guidance for public procurement, 
could be taken up in Finland without delay. Some cost-effective instruments, such as 
mechanisms for cost sharing and recovery of risk assessment costs, require further 
development of national IAS legislation. However, such mechanisms can offer interesting 
opportunities in the near future, for example when implementing the upcoming EU 
                                                     
1
 http://www.mmm.fi/fi/index/etusivu/ymparisto/luonnonmonimuotoisuus/vieraslajit.html  
2
 http://www.mmm.fi/fi/index/etusivu/tiedotteet/121127_havina.html  
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Regulation for IAS3. Only two identified and assessed instruments, earmarked taxes and 
financial incentives for voluntary IAS control, were considered to be inappropriate for 
Finland. 
 
Based on the assessment, a number of recommendations were identified for future policy 
action on IAS in Finland: 
- Implementing a mechanism to recover the costs of non-compliance with IAS regulations, 
in particular related to high priority species such as giant hogweed. 
- Assessing the possibility of introducing an earmarked temporal ballast water levy / fee 
for commercial vessels using the Baltic Sea,  with a view to raising money for monitoring 
and research on Baltic Sea IAS 
- Developing a regulation or voluntary guidelines for public procurement related to public 
green areas in order to minimise the risks of IAS. 
- Carrying out a more comprehensive and systematic assessment of innovative and cost-
effective means to finance IAS policy action in Finland, particularly in relation to the 
upcoming EU Regulation on IAS. 
                                                     
3
 Proposal for EU Regulation on the prevention and management of the introduction and spread of invasive 
alien species (COM/2013/620): http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2013:0620:FIN:FI:PDF 
 3 
 
Table 1. Overview of the identified innovative instruments for financing and/or covering the costs of policy action on IAS. 
 
Note: Financing IAS action through earmarked taxes refers to revenue collected as a part of the common state taxation system, such as conveyance tax. IAS related 
(earmarked) fees and levies refer to dedicated payments established and carried out to address IAS. 
 
Instrument Description of the example in practice Focus Geographic 
coverage 
Obligatory / 
voluntary 
Public / private 
funding 
Applicability in 
Finland 
Impact based cost sharing 
and recovery 
Australia:  The instrument collects funding in a pre-determined 
way to finance the emergency eradication of new invasive plant 
pest incursions. 
Eradication (intentional 
and unintentional) 
National Mostly obligatory, if 
sector is party to 
the agreement 
Private and public Could be applied in 
Finland but 
requires further 
development of 
national IAS 
regulation 
Risk assessment cost 
recovery 
Australia: The instrument covers the costs of secondary risk 
assessments for species that are proposed for import and for 
which an initial risk assessment has already been carried out. 
Prevention (intentional) National Obligatory Private Could be applied in 
Finland but 
requires further 
development of 
national IAS 
regulation 
Earmarked ballast water 
levy (temporary) 
Australia: : A levy on commercial vessels is collected with a view 
to funding invasive species research and development. In addition 
to collecting funding, the levy increases awareness. 
Not specified, can be 
used to support all the 
different stages of IAS 
action 
National / 
regional 
Obligatory Private (commercial 
shipping) 
Could be taken up 
in Finland 
Cost recovery resulting 
from non-compliance or 
non-action 
Several countries: These instruments allow the recovery of the 
costs of IAS measures (e.g. emergency eradication) from liable 
parties that have breached IAS-related regulations. 
Applicable to all stages 
of IAS action 
National / 
regional 
Obligatory Private (party 
responsible for 
introduction / 
spread of IAS) 
Could be taken up 
in Finland 
Monetary incentives to 
support use / control of 
IAS 
England and Argentina: Relevant stakeholders are paid for 
participating in management of IAS or given permission for 
commercial exploitation of the species.  
Control and eradication 
(intentional / 
unintentional) 
National / 
regional / local 
Voluntary Public and/or private Not very applicable 
in Finland  
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Earmarked fees Oregon: The instrument requires boat users to go through check-
ups and buy an annual or biannual compulsory permit.  If invasive 
species are found in the check-up, the boat must be cleaned. The 
instrument  thereby controls the spread of invasive species, 
collects funding for implementing IAS legislation, and increasing 
awareness of aquatic invasive species.  
Prevention Regional (state 
level) 
Obligatory Private (boaters) Could be taken up 
in Finland (for 
certain species) 
Economic incentive based 
on the avoidance of risk-
based costs 
Australia: The instrument works through setting lower inspection 
and sampling costs for those traders and agents who utilise low-
risk pathways in their import activities. 
Prevention National Obligatory Private (importers) Could be applied in 
Finland but 
requires further 
development of 
national IAS 
regulation 
Liability-based fines and 
payments related to non-
compliance 
The UK: The instruments collect funding in the form of fines and 
other payments from parties that have breached some IAS-
related regulation. These fines or payments are intended to 
provide incentives to comply with the regulations (i.e. desired 
way of action). 
prevention and control 
(deliberate release), 
restoration 
National Obligatory Private Could be taken up 
in Finland 
Public procurement as a 
means for reducing the 
risk of spread 
Belgium, the UK and Ireland: Obligatory requirements or 
voluntary guidelines and codes of conduct that restrict or guide 
the procurement activities of public bodies (cities, local 
authorities etc.). The aim is to encourage the use of native species 
instead of non-native species in order to limit the risk of IAS 
invasions or restrict the spread of already established species. 
Prevention (intentional) National / 
regional / local 
Obligatory or 
voluntary 
Public Could be taken up 
in Finland 
Earmarked taxes related 
to IAS 
Hawaii: The instrument works by collecting funding for IAS 
management through conveyance taxes. 
varying focus, depending 
on the use of tax 
National / 
regional (state) 
Obligatory Public Not very applicable 
in Finland 
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1 Sharing the costs of pest eradication under the Emergency Plant 
Pest Response Deed (EPPRD), Australia 
 
Instrument in a nutshell: The instrument collects funding in a pre-determined way to 
finance the emergency eradication of new invasive plant pest incursions. 
 
Type of instrument: impact based cost sharing and recovery 
 
Participation: mostly obligatory, if sector is party to the agreement 
 
Source of funding: private and public 
 
Focus in terms of hierarchical approach to IAS: eradication (intentional and unintentional) 
 
Scale of application: national 
 
Current status: ongoing 
 
1.1 Description of mechanism 
 
In Australia, the Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed (EPPRD) outlines the course of action 
taken in the event of plant pest incursion, including plant pests that are IAS. EPPRD was 
adopted in 2005 and is a formal legally binding agreement between Plant Health Australia 
(PHA) (i.e. the national plant health authority), the national, state and territory 
governments, and the national plant industry representatives that are signatories to the 
Deed.  
 
The system currently covers about 25 sectors and 78 priority species, and in addition new 
species that fulfil the system criteria. 
 
In short, EPPRD establishes an obligation for both government and industry parties to raise 
an alert in the case of a possible plant pest incursion. The alert triggers the development of 
a response plan for emergency eradication. 
 
Among other things, EPPRD sets out the principles for covering the costs of emergency 
responses, including the sharing of costs between relevant private and public stakeholders. 
The cost recovery and sharing build on the classification of plant pests according to their 
estimated impacts. These impacts include negative impacts on nature, social and economic 
wellbeing (broader public) and crop sector (private). All species considered as pests are 
categorised in one of four cost sharing categories relating to their potential impacts on 
public and private resources. The category chosen dictates the appropriate split of 
eradication costs between government and private funding sources (Table 1). 
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The National Management Group (NMG) is responsible for making the key decisions 
concerning the response to an emergency plant pest (EPP) incursion under the EPPRD. The 
group is formed when an incident is identified. It consists of representatives from all 
affected parties signatory to the EPPRD. The group is responsible for approving a response 
plan, including the budget if it is agreed that eradication is feasible and cost beneficial. The 
NMG is advised on technical matters by the Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant 
Pests (CCEPP). CCEPP is a technical committee that advises the NMG on EPP incursion 
responses.  Similar to the NMG, the CCEPP is formed when an EPP is detected or suspected 
to be present. The CCEPP is responsible for assessing the grounds for eradication and for 
providing the technical advice needed for the NMG to make decisions. A scientific advisory 
panel (SAP) may be convened by the CCEPP to review and provide advice on specific 
technical matters. 
 
Plant pest category Characteristics Government 
funding 
Industry 
funding 
Category 1 Very high public benefits of eradication 
- Major damage to natural ecosystems 
- Potential impacts on human health 
- Relatively little impact on commercial crops;  difficult 
to determine which cropping sectors benefit from 
eradication 
100% 0% 
Category 2 High public benefits of eradication 
- Significant pubic losses (direct or indirect) 
- Major costs to affected cropping sector 
80% 20% 
Category 3 Moderate public benefits of eradication 
- Most negative impacts occurring to the cropping 
sector 
- Some significant negative impacts / costs to public 
50% 50% 
Category 4 Mainly private benefits of eradication 
- Little or no public cost  
- Little or no impact on natural ecosystems 
- No significant trade issues affecting national and 
regional economies 
20% 80% 
 
Table 1. Categorisation of plant pests according to their estimated impacts 
 
Source:  Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed http://www.planthealthaustralia.com.au/wp-
content/uploads/2013/08/EPPRD-9-August-2013.pdf     
 
1.2 Experience of effectiveness 
 
No documented information could be found on the effectiveness of the cost recovery and 
sharing mechanism under EPPRD. This is because, due to the confidentiality requirements 
associated with the EPPRD, certain information relating to the EPPRD or specific responses 
to incursions is not publically available. 
 
In general, it seems to be considered that the systematic and structured EPPRD response 
has been able to deliver quality and timely outcomes, increasing the chance of achieving the 
set goals of emergency response. However, the existing information also highlights a 
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number of broader issues with effectiveness of EPPRD. The perceived deficiencies include, 
for example, slowness and lack of staff and resources of the government agencies managing 
the response, leading to unsuccessful eradication. Furthermore, one of the key sectors, i.e. 
the forest sector, has not yet agreed to sign EPPRD. Consequently, it has been 
recommended that EPPRD should be further developed to ensure an appropriate length of 
time for the initial investigation and alert phases, to enable the right decision to be made. In 
addition, priority is needed to be given to both resourcing and funding during the early 
stages of an emergency response. Finally, it is important to ensure that a strategy to address 
IAS invasions is available even if the required response does not fall under EPPRD. 
 
1.3 Assessment of pros and cons 
 
Coverage: Moderate. The mechanism covers only the costs of one IAS group (plant pests) 
and one area of IAS policy implementation (eradication). 
  
Cost-effectiveness: Relatively high. In principle, the EPPRD cost sharing mechanism appears 
cost-effective. The procedure for emergency eradication cost recovery is a targeted 
measure aimed at covering all costs of an eradication event and, therefore, it can be 
considered cost-effective. Furthermore, the arrangements and funding have been agreed 
beforehand and therefore no time needs to be wasted for negotiations at the time of the 
invasion. Additionally, in most categories there is some industry funding, providing 
incentives for the industry to act in a precautionary manner. 
 
However, it is to be noted that the cost-efficiency of the cost-sharing mechanism does not 
guarantee the effectiveness of eradication itself which depends on the effectiveness of the 
overall mechanism, location in question and eradication means used, etc. As highlighted 
above, insights from the application of the EPPRD in practice indicate that there are still 
issues to be addressed. 
 
Legislative requirements: Required. EPPRD is a formal legally binding agreement between 
Plant Health Australia (PHA) and industry stakeholders.  
 
Administrative burden: Relatively high (initial) – Relatively low (additional). The procedure 
for emergency eradication cost recovery does not introduce a great administrative burden. 
However, the cost recovery builds on to the overall EPPRD procedure which can be rather 
resource intensive. For each emergency plant pest (EEP) incursion there is a need to 
establish an NMG supported by CCEPP. Each of these groups requires the involvement of 
several experts, for example CCEPP consists of the national Chief Plant Protection Officer, all 
state and territory Chief Plant Health Managers, as well as nominated representatives from 
each Affected Party. 
 
Requirements for public funding: Relatively high (initial) – Relatively low (additional). As 
above, the procedure for emergency eradication cost recovery introduces limited additional 
requirements for funding. However, the overall EPPRD procedure is mainly funded from 
public sources (government and state budgets). 
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Acceptability / legitimacy: Relatively high. The share of costs recovered from different 
public and private stakeholders is linked to the assessment of foreseen negative impacts of 
IAS invasion. Thus, the benefits of avoided negative impacts and/or costs to stakeholders 
should be similarly shared, increasing acceptability and legitimacy of the measure. 
 
Links to addressing fundamental aspects of IAS problem: Moderate. Rapid response can be 
considered a fundamental aspect. Also, EPPRD can be considered to (indirectly) increase 
awareness of IAS among private stakeholders. 
 
1.4 Assessment of applicability in Finland 
 
Required legislative support: EPPRD is a formal legally binding agreement between relevant 
public and private stakeholders. In addition, EPPRD builds on a broader legislative 
framework on managing risks of IAS that are plant pests. 
 
Existing legislation hindering application in Finland: N/A  
 
Administrative burden: Depends on the scope of the measure. Foreseen additional 
administrative burden is relatively limited if the emergency eradication cost recovery is 
developed for IAS falling under the current plant pest framework. However, if the plant pest 
framework is expanded to cover ‘additional’ IAS (e.g. IAS with negative impacts on 
biodiversity only) then there may be requirements for additional administration. 
 
Requirements for public funding: The procedure for emergency eradication cost recovery 
introduces limited additional requirements for funding. However, there may be the need to 
adjust the existing regulative framework for plant pests which might require additional 
public funding (see above). 
 
Acceptability / legitimacy: Linking the share of costs recovered to the benefits of 
eradication to stakeholders is likely to result in relatively high acceptability and legitimacy of 
the measure also in Finland. 
 
→ Establishing a procedure for emergency eradication cost recovery, similar to Australia, 
could be a possible IAS policy measure in Finland, especially if at first instance building on 
the current regulative framework for plant pests.   
 
However, for plant pests, it has recently been agreed that the state will cease to 
compensate producers for eradication. Consequently, following the Australian system 
would mean back-tracking somewhat towards the old system where compensation was 
paid. 
 
1.5 Key references 
 
Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed, http://www.planthealthaustralia.com.au/wp-
content/uploads/2013/08/EPPRD-9-August-2013.pdf   
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Plant Health Australia, http://www.planthealthaustralia.com.au/biosecurity/emergency-
plant-pest-response-deed/  
 
National Plant Biodiversity Status Report (2012) (Chapter 4), 
http://www.planthealthaustralia.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/2012-Status-
Report-Chapter-4.pdf  
 
Carnegie, A. and Cooper, K. (2011) Emergency response to the incursion of an exotic 
myrtaceous rust in Australia. Australasian Plant Pathology 40, 346-359. 
 
Contact: Susanna Driessen, General Manager Emergency Response and Preparedness 
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2 Cost recovery in the context of Weed Risk Assessment (WRA), 
Australia 
 
Instrument in a nutshell: The instrument covers the costs of secondary risk assessments for 
species that are proposed for import and for which an initial risk assessment has already 
been carried out. 
 
Type of instrument: cost recovery 
 
Participation: obligatory 
 
Source of funding: private 
 
Focus in terms of hierarchical approach to IAS: prevention (intentional) 
 
Scale of application: national 
 
Current status: ongoing 
 
2.1 Description of mechanism 
 
In Australia, a systematic science-based weed risk assessment (WRA) process was adopted 
in 1997 with a view to determine the weed potential of proposed new plant imports. If a 
species is determined as a ‘weed’ in the WRA process then its import to Australia is not 
permitted. 
 
The Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF), the main body responsible for 
national biosecurity, conducts WRAs on all new plant species proposed for introduction into 
Australia as seeds, tissue culture or any other material for propagation.  
 
The WRA process is a three-tiered system that involves the importer and DAFF.  
 
 Tier 1: In the first instance, the status of the plant in Australia is determined as 1) 
present in Australia and not under official control or 2) listed on the import conditions 
database (ICON) and/or 3) listed on the permitted seeds list. This instance can be 
initiated by the importer by checking whether the plant proposed for introduction is 
present in the ICON database or added to the permitted seeds list. If the species is 
absent from both of these lists, the importer must complete a new plant introduction 
form and submit it to DAFF. This initiates the WRA process.  
 Tier 2: WRA is administrated by DAFF. It is a question-based assessment of the weed 
potential of plants proposed for import. Assessment involves answering up to 49 
questions on specific characteristics of a plant. The answers generate a numerical score 
relating to the weed potential of that plant. The score is used to determine an outcome: 
accept the species for importation; reject the species for importation; or reject pending 
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further evaluation of the species’ weed potential. While DAFF is the usual body 
responsible for carrying out WRAs, they can be also completed by the importer by 
following the set WRA process. However, all WRAs must be validated by DAFF. 
 Tier 3: If import conditions cannot be determined following a WRA, importers may be 
given the opportunity to provide more information for re-assessment of the species or 
to continue to post-entry evaluation under Tier 3. 
 
The first WRA is funded by the Australian government and there is no specific cost to the 
applicant. However, if the importer wishes to carry out a new WRA then they must bear the 
costs, e.g. in the case that the importer wishes to contest the results and/or carry out a new 
WRA for a species earlier deemed to be a weed. Also, if import conditions for a species 
cannot be determined following a WRA the costs of any further re-assessment should be 
covered by the importer under Tier 3. 
 
2.2 Experience of effectiveness 
 
No information allowing general conclusions on effectiveness is available in the public 
domain.  
 
2.3 Assessment of pros and cons 
 
Coverage: Moderate. Covers only the costs of one IAS group (weeds) and one area of IAS 
policy implementation (prevention). 
  
Cost-effectiveness: Moderate. Risk assessment procedure targets and prevention is 
considered as one of the most cost-effective means to address IAS problems. However, the 
cost recovery is focused on ‘secondary’ / additional RAs only and therefore it only covers a 
limited amount of the total RA costs. 
 
Legislative requirements: Required.  
 
Administrative burden: Relatively high. RA recovery systems do not introduce a great 
administrative burden. However, the cost recovery builds on an established national risk 
assessment framework which, in turn, introduces quite some administrative requirements. 
 
Requirements for public funding: Relatively high. RA recovery systems introduce limited 
additional requirements for funding. However, the overall RA framework is mainly funded 
from public sources (government budget). Furthermore, RA cost recovery only applies to 
‘secondary’ RAs requested to be carried out by the importers; the initial RA is carried out by 
relevant national authorities using public funding. 
 
Acceptability / legitimacy: Relatively high. Cost recovery from importers is limited to the 
‘secondary’ / additional RA only. The system is consistent with the polluter (risk imposer) 
pays principle. 
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Links to addressing fundamental aspects of IAS problem: RAs in general relate to 
prevention and therefore directly address the root causes of IAS invasion. Furthermore, the 
recovery payments can indirectly support awareness-raising and consideration of risks 
among industry stakeholders. However, given the cost recovery is restricted to a limited 
number of RAs only, the overall impacts on industry awareness are likely to be limited. 
 
2.4 Assessment of applicability in Finland 
 
Required legislative support: Requires development: RA cost recovery builds on a broader 
legislative framework for IAS risk assessments. Integration of the upcoming EU Regulation 
on IAS into national legislation is likely to require the establishment of a RA framework. 
 
Existing legislation hindering application in Finland: N/A  
 
Administrative burden: Foreseen additional administrative burden related to RA cost 
recovery is relatively limited. However, the adoption of such a measure first requires the 
establishment of a national RA framework for IAS. 
 
Requirements for public funding: The procedure for RA cost recovery introduces limited 
additional requirements for public funding. However, it requires the establishment of 
national RA framework for IAS which requires public investment. 
 
Acceptability / legitimacy: The system is consistent with the polluter (risk imposer) pays 
principle and this is likely to result in high acceptability also in Finland. Furthermore, limiting 
the cost recovered to ‘secondary’ RAs / additional information only might further increase 
acceptability. 
 
→ Establishing a procedure for RA cost recovery could be a possible IAS policy measure in 
Finland, linked with the foreseen required establishment of broader national IAS RA 
framework.  
 
2.5 Key references 
 
The Australian weed risk assessment process, 
http://www.daff.gov.au/ba/reviews/weeds/system 
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3 Ballast Water Research and Development Funding Levy, 
Australia 
Instrument in a nutshell: A levy to commercial vessels is collected with a view to fund 
invasive species research and development. In addition to collecting funding, the levy 
increases awareness. 
 
Type of instrument: levy (earmarked) 
 
Participation: obligatory 
 
Source of funding: private 
 
Focus in terms of hierarchical approach to IAS: not specified (prevention) 
 
Scale of application: national 
 
Current status: temporary instrument, not active anymore  
 
3.1 Description of mechanism 
 
In Australia a temporary ballast water levy was adopted in 1998 with a view to create 
funding for the national Strategic Ballast Water Research and Development Programme 
developed by the Australian Ballast Water Management Advisory Council. 
 
The levy was based on a legislative Act that allowed the collection of an earmarked payment 
from the commercial shipping sector during a two-year period. The underlying rationale for 
the levy was that those responsible for the increased risk of IAS invasions in the marine and 
coastal environment – while also commercially benefiting from the activity – would 
contribute to financing the policy actions to minimise these risks. 
 
The levy consisted of two types of payments: AUD 210 (around EUR 140) for bulk carriers 
and AUD 140 (around EUR 95) per vessel for all other ships (e.g. tankers) with a length of 40 
metres or longer. The process for paying the levy varied between vessels, depending on the 
destination and length of their route. However, it was capped to be paid maximum four 
times per year (once in every quarter of the year). 
 
The levy payments were earmarked to create funding for the national ballast water 
programme with a target of AUD 2 million (around EUR 1.4 million) to be reached. Once the 
AUD 2 million was reached in 2000, the levy ceased to exist. 
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3.2 Experience of effectiveness 
 
No information allowing general conclusions on effectiveness is available in the public 
domain.  
 
3.3 Assessment of pros and cons 
 
Coverage: Relatively low / moderate direct coverage. The programme was focused on 
addressing one IAS pathway only, namely ballast water. Funding collected via levy was 
earmarked to be used for research and development related to the spread of IAS through 
ballast water. This can be an effective way to ensure that national policy measures build on 
comprehensive, best available information and knowledge. However, research and 
development activities only form a basis for policy action on IAS and in the long-term a 
systematic uptake of results, best practises, innovations etc. is needed. 
  
Cost-effectiveness: Relatively high for creating funding / Relatively low broader 
effectiveness. Establishing a temporary levy can in itself be considered as a rather straight 
forward, cost-effective policy measure for creating earmarked funding for IAS research and 
development. Furthermore, in general IAS policy measures related to ballast water are first 
and foremost linked to prevention which is the most cost-effective means to address IAS 
problems. However, the final effectiveness of the levy is determined by the effectiveness of 
the national Strategic Ballast Water Research and Development Program in decreasing the 
risk of IAS invasion via ballast water. No information could be found to support such an 
assessment.  
 
Finally, it is to be noted that the levy has a limited cost-effectiveness from the perspective of 
the broader IAS policy. For example, the levy is set at a very low level and therefore, 
although creating funding, it is unlikely to function as a means to reduce risk behaviour in 
general. See also ‘links to addressing broader IAS policy’ below. 
 
Legislative requirements: Required. The levy was based on a dedicated legislative Act. 
 
Administrative burden: Relatively low. There are no significant administrative requirements 
beyond the administration of the levy and Ballast Water Research and Development 
Program. 
 
Requirements for public funding: Relatively low. There is no need for significant new public 
funding beyond the administration of the levy. 
 
Acceptability / legitimacy: Relatively high. The levy is temporary and relatively low cost 
which increased acceptability among the key stakeholders. The impact assessment (2007) 
stated that the levy obtained the full support of the shipping industry. Furthermore, political 
acceptability of the levy is likely to be high given that both the need for public funding and 
risk of political failure are low. 
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Links to addressing fundamental aspects of IAS problem: The levy supports awareness-
raising within the shipping industry. Furthermore, ballast water pathway control is, to a 
large extent, preventative by nature, aiming to limit the spread of IAS. However, the levy is 
set at a very low level and therefore, although creating funding, it is unlikely to function as a 
means to reduce risk behaviour in general.  
 
3.4 Assessment of applicability in Finland 
 
Required legislative support: Establishment of such a levy in Finland is likely to require a 
legislative basis. Integration of the upcoming EU Regulation on IAS into national legislation 
could facilitate the establishment of such a basis.  
 
Existing legislation hindering application in Finland: N/A  
 
Administrative burden: Very limited increase in administrative requirements is likely; 
resources are needed for administration of the levy system and the earmarked fund. 
 
Requirements for public funding: Likely to require some public funding to cover start-up 
costs, however the private funding obtained via the levy is designed to cover all other costs. 
 
Acceptability / legitimacy: Keeping the levy fees low is likely to increase legitimacy among 
stakeholders whereas limited needs for public funding should increase political support. 
However, it is difficult to predict what the general attitude among the shipping industry 
towards such a measure might be. 
 
→ A temporary levy targeting the shipping industry and creating earmarked ‘seed funding’ 
for IAS research and development could be a possible IAS policy measure in Finland, for 
example in the context of the Baltic Sea, possibly focusing on preventing the spread of IAS 
though hull fouling. Unlike ballast water, hull fouling is an IAS pathway that remains to be 
systematically addressed. 
 
3.5 Key references 
 
Ballast Water Research and Development Funding Levy Bill (1997),  
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/bill_em/bwradflb1997486/memo_0.pdf  
 
Ballast Water Research and Development Funding Levy Collection Act (1998), 
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2004A05351  
 
Ballast Water Research and Development Funding Levy Collection Regulations (1998), 
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/F1998B00133/Download   
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4 Cost recovery related to non-compliance with IAS regulations 
 
Instrument in a nutshell: The instruments allow recovering the costs of IAS measures (e.g. 
emergency eradication) from liable parties that have breached IAS-related regulation. 
 
Type of instrument: cost recovery resulting from non-compliance or non-action 
 
Participation: obligatory 
 
Source of funding: private 
 
Focus in terms of hierarchical approach to IAS: applicable to all stages 
 
Scale of application: national / regional 
 
Current status: ongoing  
 
4.1 Description of mechanism 
 
Cost recovery due to non-compliance (prevention / control of prohibited species): Since 
2009 in the state of Wisconsin (US), the invasive species rule (Wis. Adm. Code ch. NR 40) 
makes it illegal to possess, transport, transfer, or introduce certain invasive species without 
a permit. The rule applies to individuals, businesses and organisations alike. Invasive species 
are classified into two categories: prohibited and restricted. For prohibited species, the 
transport, possession, transfer and introduction is banned. Individuals, businesses or 
organisations found responsible for a prohibited species' presence on the property they 
own, control or manage may be ordered to carry out control measures. If a control order is 
not followed, the state authority is allowed to carry out the control measures with an option 
to seek cost-recovery. Restricted species are also subject to a ban on transport, transfer and 
introduction, but possession is allowed (with the exception of fish and crayfish). Control of 
restricted species is encouraged, but not required. Unintentional transport, possession, 
transfer or introduction of invasive species without a permit is exempt, however only if it is 
determined that reasonable precautions were taken to prevent accidental introductions. 
 
Cost recovery and fines due to non-compliance (emergency measures for non-established 
species): Several Eastern states of the US have implemented emergency bans on the 
transport of wood (including firewood) to prevent the spread and outbreaks of Emerald Ash 
Borer. For example, in Iowa the ban entered into force in November 2013 and it stipulates 
that wood products cannot be moved from a county under quarantine unless a permit has 
been issued by the regional authority or the article has been appropriately treated, under 
supervision, to exterminate any pests. The cost of treatment or destruction of an emerald 
ash borer-infested regulated article, in violation of the quarantine, shall be borne by the 
owner or person in charge of the regulated article or place of production. If the owner or 
person refuses or neglects to obey the emergency ban provisions, the expenses related to 
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treatment or destruction of an article shall be collected retrospectively, e.g. if necessary via 
the annual tax procedure. 
 
Fines and/or cost recovery for non-compliance (control of established species): In Finland, 
a regulation to control common wild oat was updated in 2002. The law bans sale and 
release of items that may be infested with the common wild oat. It aims at eradication of 
infestations found on fields, and requires the farmers to notify the authorities of 
infestations and subsequently to eradicate the infestation. Once the authorities have been 
notified, they survey the field and prepare a control guidance (for minor infestations) or 
control plan (for major infestations or if the previous guidance has not been followed). If the 
plan is not followed, agricultural subsidies may be denied, a fine may be issued and the 
control action may be carried out at the farmer’s expense. 
 
4.2 Experience of effectiveness 
 
No information allowing general conclusions on effectiveness is available in the public 
domain.  
 
4.3 Assessment of pros and cons 
 
Coverage: Relatively high – relatively low. Coverage related to the use of cost recovery 
depends on the coverage of the targeted regulation. The mechanisms can be applied to all 
species under restriction. It can also be applied to both intentional and unintentional human 
actions. Can be applied to all control strategies (from prevention to control). In practice, 
including the examples above, the focus is often limited to the eradication of new or already 
established species.  
 
Cost-effectiveness: Relatively high - Moderate. The cost-effectiveness depends on the scope 
and coverage of the targeted regulation. In general, targeting prevention (e.g. intentional 
introduction of IAS) is commonly considered as one of the most cost-effective means to 
address IAS problems whereas targeting control and eradication are known to be less cost-
effective.  Consequently, in terms of overall IAS policy implementation cost recovery related 
to the eradication of species that are not yet established can be considered most cost-
effective. Furthermore, cost-effectiveness also depends on the ratio between the costs to 
be recovered and the burden of proof required to do so, i.e. if detecting and/or 
demonstrating non-compliance requires significant efforts then these costs might become 
higher than the actual costs foreseen to be recovered. 
 
Legislative requirements: Required.  
 
Administrative burden: Low additional burden. Established control and monitoring systems 
for movement / establishment of IAS (e.g. imports and movement within country) are 
required. However, where these systems already exist the payment system for non-
compliance results in limited additional burden. 
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Requirements for (additional) public funding: Low additional funding.  Established control 
and monitoring systems for movement / establishment of IAS require public funding. 
However, the payment system for non-compliance does not introduce new requirements 
for public funding. It is also to be noted that revenue collection by the instrument is likely to 
be minor. 
 
Acceptability / legitimacy: Relatively high. Cost recovery related to non-compliance is, to a 
large extent, based on the polluter pays principle. Consequently, they should be generally 
supported by stakeholders, decision-makers and broader public. 
 
Links to addressing fundamental aspects of IAS problem: Depends on the coverage of the 
targeted regulation. Cost recovery related to prevention (e.g. introduction and movement of 
IAS and related emergency eradication) is considered to be more effective in addressing the 
root causes of the IAS problem than cost recovery related to the eradication and control of 
already established species. Furthermore, the payments can indirectly support awareness-
raising. 
 
4.4 Assessment of applicability in Finland 
 
Required legislative support: As elsewhere, the establishment of non-compliance related 
cost recovery in Finland is foreseen to require a legislative instrument. 
 
Existing legislation hindering application in Finland: N/A  
 
Administrative burden: The requirements for (additional) administrative burden depend on 
the scope of the cost recovery and already existing framework. If the payment would be 
focused on a certain high priority IAS only (e.g. Giant Hogweed) then the administrative 
requirements would be relatively limited, focusing mainly on identification and inspection of 
key sites for invasion. However, non-compliance cost recovery related to intentional 
introduction of IAS requires the development of a more comprehensive national framework 
for such introductions. 
 
Requirements for public funding: The requirements for (additional) public funding depend 
on the scope of the cost recovery. Requirements for (additional) public funding are limited 
when the cost-recovery payment would be focused on a certain IAS only (e.g. covering costs 
of targeted inspections). Non-compliance payments related to intentional introduction of 
IAS require the development of a more comprehensive national framework with 
requirements for additional public funding. 
 
Acceptability / legitimacy: Payments related to non-compliance are, to a large extent, 
based on the polluter pays principle and therefore they should be generally acceptable also 
in Finland. Furthermore, the required (additional) public funding is limited. 
 
→ Non-compliance related cost recovery, targeting either all or certain IAS, could be a 
possible IAS policy measure in Finland. Similar payments are already used in the context of 
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plant pest and animal health management and they could provide a basis for extending the 
mechanism to a broader group of IAS.  
 
In the first instance, cost recovery could be applied to the eradication of certain high priority 
species such as the Giant Hogweed. In the long run, non-compliance cost-recovery 
payments could be linked to the broader regulative EU / national framework for preventing 
the entry / movement of IAS in Finland, for example extended to all species identified as ‘IAS 
of Union concern’ under the EU Regulation. 
 
4.5 Key references 
 
Invasive species rule in the state of Wisconsin (US), 
http://dnr.wi.gov/topic/Invasives/classification.html and 
http://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/code/admin_code/nr/001/40.pdf  
 
Regulation to prevent moving fire wood in the state of Wisconsin (US), 
http://dnr.wi.gov/topic/Invasives/firewood.html 
 
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources Report (2012) Invasive Species Programs, 
http://dnr.wi.gov/topic/invasives/documents/islegreport2012.pdf 
 
Emergency quarantine of firewood and ash products established in Iowa (US), 
http://www.iowaagriculture.gov/press/2013press/press11012013.asp 
 
Legislation on common wild oat in Finland, 
http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/ajantasa/2002/20020185  
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5 Incentives for the use and/or voluntary control of IAS  
Instrument in a nutshell: Relevant stakeholders are paid for participating in management of 
invasive species or given permission for commercial exploitation of the species. 
 
Type of instrument: monetary incentives to support use / control of IAS 
 
Participation: voluntary 
 
Source of funding: public and private 
 
Focus in terms of hierarchical approach to IAS: control (intentional / unintentional) 
 
Scale of application: varies 
 
Current status: ongoing  
 
5.1 Description of mechanism 
 
Payment for trapping IAS: In Argentina Tierra del Fuego, the invasion of Canadian beaver 
has caused significant negative impacts on both biodiversity and human wellbeing over the 
past years. The recent plans to manage the beaver population include the establishment of 
a payment targeting independent hunters and inhabitants of rural areas to prevent re-
invasion. The payment is foreseen as part of a broader beaver management programme 
piloted in the area, aimed at controlling the overall density of beavers and eradicating the 
species in certain key locations. The hunting activities will be financed by a combination of 
funds from the government, private co-financing and international GEF funded project, 
amounting to close to USD 5 million over a 4 year period (2012 – 2016). The hunting 
activities will focus especially in forest areas and the hope is to establish a continuous 
beaver trapping culture that helps to decrease the pressure of the species and the 
possibility of re-invasion on eradicated areas. In addition to providing financial incentives, 
the programme will focus on the development of tools and capacity building for control and 
containment of the beaver, establishment of a monitoring system for rehabilitation of 
biodiversity and native ecosystems, development and implementation of eventual 
rehabilitation support strategies, and capacity building in systematic monitoring and control 
of re-invasion. 
 
Commercial use of IAS: Encouraging (commercial) use of Chinese mitten crab population 
(Eriocheir sinensis) in the Thames River, the UK is considered one of the means used to 
control the population size of the invasive species. The fishing activities are regulated by the 
Environment Agency and can be carried out only by authorised parties. The costs of 
authorisation are recovered through fees paid by applicants. However, the possible negative 
side effects on the endangered eel (below) have so far hindered the uptake of (commercial) 
use of mitten crab as a means for its control (see effectiveness below).  
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The decision for allowing commercial use of mitten crab was based on a feasibility study by 
the Natural History Museum (2008). The study concluded that the Thames mitten crab was 
edible (e.g. free of parasites) and its population was large enough to support an artisanal 
fishing industry and that the commercial use of mitten crab had the potential to reduce 
species numbers from the catchment while providing additional financial benefits for local 
fishermen. However, it was also concluded that increased fishing of mitten crab would 
result in negative side effects to the eel population: the latter species would be a 
considerable part of the by-catch. Consequently mitten crab fishing was recommended to 
be controlled and licensed, including possible monitoring of eel captures. Furthermore, any 
commercial use of mitten crab should be considered as temporary, aimed at depleting, not 
maintaining, the population. 
 
5.2 Experience of effectiveness 
 
Canadian beaver in Tierra del Fuego / Argentina: The pilot programme has been initiated 
only recently and therefore it is too early to draw conclusions about its effectiveness, 
possible risks etc. 
 
Chinese mitten crab in the Thames / the UK: although the authorisation process has been 
established (e.g. charges for different mitten crab fishing methods), no fishing other than for 
monitoring or scientific purposes has been authorised in 2012 and 2013. 
 
5.3 Assessment of pros and cons 
 
Coverage: Relatively low. The measure is commonly limited to one, usually rather easily 
recognisable, IAS species only. Moreover, effective means of catching the species must exist 
(fishing, shooting, trapping etc.). 
 
Cost-effectiveness: Moderate. Depends on the feasibility for stakeholders to trap / catch 
the species in question and this way effectively contribute to the eradication / control. In 
general, eradication and control are considered less cost-effective means for addressing IAS 
than prevention. 
 
Legislative requirements: Not necessarily required.  
 
Administrative burden: Moderate. The mechanism requires resources to administrate the 
payment system. Furthermore, requires the establishment of a reliable monitoring system 
to monitor the eradication of IAS and establish / manage possible negative impacts on non-
IAS species. 
 
Requirements for (additional) public funding: Relatively high. Economic incentives are 
commonly based on public funding.  
 
Acceptability / legitimacy:  Relatively high – relatively low. Economic incentives for 
eradication / control of IAS are voluntary and therefore depend on uptake by stakeholders. 
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The relevant stakeholders (hunters, fishermen) are generally willing to support the initiative 
as there are direct benefits to them. However, IAS experts are often sceptical about such 
economic incentives as, if not carefully managed, they might have a perverse impact on IAS 
policy implementation, ending up supporting the maintenance of the IAS population rather 
than eradicating it. In some cases environmental NGOs may also be opposed to the 
schemes. 
 
Links to addressing fundamental aspects of IAS problem: Limited links to addressing 
underlining causes of the IAS problem. Furthermore, economic initiatives for hunting / 
capturing IAS and encouraging their utilisation can be counterproductive for IAS policy 
implementation, encouraging attitudes towards the maintenance of populations rather than 
eradication. Therefore, economic incentives for trapping or hunting are not commonly 
considered to be a good management strategy on their own. 
 
5.4 Assessment of applicability in Finland 
 
Required legislative support: No legislative support necessarily required.  
 
Existing legislation hindering application in Finland: N/A 
 
Administrative burden: There are some foreseen additional administrative requirements 
related to the administration of payments and also possibly to the increased monitoring of 
payment related impacts (i.e. targeted IAS and possible negative impacts of non-IAS 
species). 
 
Requirements for public funding: There are new requirements for public funding as the 
economic incentives would most likely be based on public funding. The additional 
administrative requirements may also require some increased public funds. 
 
Acceptability / legitimacy: Economic incentives encouraging fishing or hunting of IAS are 
likely to be well accepted by hunters and fishermen. On the other hand, IAS experts are 
likely to be sceptical towards such measures due to the risks involved (see above). It may 
also be that environmental NGOs will object such schemes. 
 
→ Using economic incentives such as payments to promote voluntary IAS management is 
not considered the most feasible option for Finland in the immediate future. This is because 
it needs to be ensured that such incentives are not counterproductive toward IAS policy 
objectives in general (i.e. encourage utilisation rather than prevention / eradication) and 
therefore using such economic incentives should build on a more comprehensive, 
prevention based IAS legislation than currently in place. 
 
5.5 Key references 
 
Management of Canadian beavers in Argentina, information on GEF project (2012-2016), 
http://www.thegef.org/gef/project_detail?projID=4768 
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Commercial use of Chinese mitten crab in Thames - feasibility study (2008), 
http://www.nhm.ac.uk/resources-rx/files/mitten-crab-report-executive-summary-
57669.pdf  
 
Fishing authorisation for Chinese mitten crab in England and Wales (2013), 
http://www.environment-agency.gov.uk/business/sectors/32645.aspx  
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6 The Aquatic Invasive Species Permit Programme, Oregon (the 
US) 
Instrument in a nutshell: The instrument requires boaters to go through check-ups and buy 
an annual or biannual compulsory permit, and thereby collects funding for implementing 
IAS legislation as well as increases awareness of aquatic invasive species. If invasive species 
are found in the check-up, the boat will be cleaned. 
 
Type of instrument: permit fees (earmarked) 
 
Participation: obligatory 
 
Focus in terms of hierarchical approach to IAS: prevention 
 
Type of funding: private 
 
Scale of application: regional (State) 
 
Current status: ongoing, since 2009 
 
6.1 Description of mechanism 
 
The Aquatic Invasive Species Permit Programme was adopted in Oregon State, the US, in 
2009. The programme’s goal is to protect Oregon against the introduction and spread of 
aquatic invasive species (AIS) such as Quagga and zebra mussels (D. polymorpha). The 
programme stipulates that the owners of non-motorised and motorised boats, from 10 feet 
long, must go through official check-ups and get permits for using the State waterways. The 
permits must be renewed every 1 or 2 years, depending on the boat.  
 
Boaters without an aquatic invasive species permit will be fined USD 30 - 50. In addition, for 
the current recreational boating season inspection stations have been set up at the points of 
entry into Oregon and at other random locations. Failure to stop at an inspection station 
could result in a USD 110 fine. 
 
The administrative responsibilities of the programme are divided institutionally between 
The Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife (ODFW), the Oregon State Marine Board 
(OSMB) and the State Department of Agriculture. OSMB is the agency responsible for 
coordination and administration of the programme whereas ODFW is primarily responsible 
for conducting craft inspections and contaminations. In the latter case, ODFW may require a 
person operating or transporting a recreational or commercial craft to stop at a check point 
for the purpose of an inspection for the presence of aquatic invasive species. In these cases, 
the inspector may decontaminate or recommend decontamination of any recreational or 
commercial watercraft.  
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The permit fees are earmarked to be used to support the implementation of AIS (Aquatic 
Invasive Species) legislation. All permit revenues are deposited into the Aquatic Invasive 
Species Prevention Fund, which covers all expenses of the AIS Permit Programme (e.g. costs 
of decontamination above). OSMB administers this fund and distributes funds to ODFW and 
other relevant law enforcement agencies under intergovernmental agreements and 
contracts for services.  
 
During the 2012 fiscal year (July 2011 -June 2012), the revenue collected from permit sales 
was USD 731,474, showing a slight decrease from the 2011 fiscal year. With the early 
programme start-up costs completed, more funding is foreseen to be allocated to ODFW 
during the 2013/2015 biennium to increase their summer field inspection activity. 
 
A programme similar to Oregon is also in place in Idaho, called the Idaho Invasive Species 
Program. In Idaho, all owners of non-motorised and motorised boats, from 10 feet long, 
must purchase an Invasive Species Fund sticker, to assist in funding the prevention of 
invasive aquatic species within the state. The fees generated from the sale of the stickers 
will fund vessel inspections, washing stations and information materials that will assist Idaho 
with preventing the introduction of IAS. The sticker is to be renewed every year; boats not 
displaying the required sticker will be fined a fixed penalty of USD 57. 
 
6.2 Experience of effectiveness 
 
Existing documentation regarding the by-passing of inspection sites indicates a 70% 
compliance rate. Furthermore, the compliance rates have been increasing by at least 20% 
each year since the start of the programme in 2009. 
 
Due to the relatively short time period of the programme in action, it is hard to assess 
effectiveness considering the population growth of AIS.  
 
As regards legitimacy and awareness-raising, according to experts the boating public was at 
first sceptical towards the fee.  For example, the boaters were not convinced that the 
government would use the revenue generated specifically for AIS prevention and they 
perceived the fee as a new government tax aimed at raising needed money for other state 
programs.  However, contact with boaters did provide an opportunity to engage them in 
conversation about the issues surrounding AIS and the risk associated with the 
establishment of certain species.  In most cases this created an opportunity to educate the 
boaters on AIS issues and explain how the prevention programme benefitted all Oregon 
boaters and the general public.  Generally speaking, after their conversation with the AIS 
officials, people were much more understanding of AIS issues and supportive towards the 
fee and prevention programme.  
 
In the state law that created the permit programme it states that the revenue must be only 
used on AIS prevention work and that an annual report would be written to explain the use 
of the fees and what work was completed.  Having the fee revenue deposited into a 
dedicated fund with specific purpose helped to calm the public's distrust.   
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6.3 Assessment of pros and cons 
 
Coverage: Moderate. Covers the prevention of those aquatic IAS that are transferred by 
boats and a certain group of stakeholders directly related to spread of IAS in inland water 
bodies. The mechanism does not address the broader group of stakeholders with links to 
aquatic IAS, such as aquarium trade and on-shore anglers. 
  
Cost-effectiveness: Moderate - Relatively high. High compliance rate indicates relatively 
good effectiveness in terms of take-up of the measure. It also appears that the sales of 
permits are, at least at this stage, able to cover a significant part of programme’s costs. 
While it is not yet possible to assess the effectiveness of the programme in terms of spread 
and development of AIS, targeting prevention in a successful manner can be considered as 
one of the most cost-effective means to address IAS problems. 
 
On the other hand, the fines are also fairly low and therefore there is a risk that they fail to 
be effective in changing stakeholder behaviour. However, the reported high compliance rate 
above indicates that in Oregon this has not been the case. 
 
Legislative requirements: Required. There are 16 statutes and rules released related to the 
AIS Prevention Programme. The programme is based on the legislative Acts and their 
implementation (inc. boat check-ups) as core mechanisms: roadside inspection stations 
established, mobile decontamination units, additional inspections at by-passing inspection 
sites and inspections on-call, at public boating events or requested inspections. 
 
Administrative burden: Relatively low. ODFW provides one Invasive Species Coordinator 
(partial funding) and OSMB provides one AIS coordinator and one quarter-time accounting 
technician. 
 
Requirements for public funding: Low. There is no need for significant new public funding. 
The funds generated through fees are designed to support the implementation of the 
programme itself (e.g. to fund the mobile watercraft inspection teams). In addition, funds 
are used to support public education and outreach efforts and other relevant AIS activities.  
 
Acceptability / legitimacy: Moderate - Relatively high. Permits are of low cost which is likely 
to increase acceptability among the key stakeholders (USD5 or USD10, depending on the 
boat type). Furthermore, the inspection costs are mainly funded through the permit fees 
making requirements for additional / new public funding low. This is likely to increase 
political acceptability of the programme. However, the introduction of a fee might be 
considered as an additional regulatory burden which might reduce its acceptability both 
from the perspective of stakeholders and decision-makers. Consequently, dedicated efforts 
in stakeholder engagement are needed to address this. 
 
Links to addressing fundamental aspects of IAS problem: The programme is focused on 
prevention and limiting risks of invasion by intercepting IAS ‘infested’ boats at inspection 
stations. The programme also supports awareness-raising. Education and outreach is a key 
component of the AIS Prevention Programme. This is achieved by providing printed 
materials and interacting with the public at inspection stations, attending boating events, 
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teaching watercraft inspection and invasive species workshops, or attending public 
meetings to speak about the programme. There are also public information signs installed at 
20 locations on highways at boarder locations. 
 
6.4 Assessment of applicability in Finland 
 
Required legislative support: Establishment of such permit system in Finland is likely to 
require a legislative basis. Integration of the upcoming EU Regulation on IAS into national 
legislation could facilitate the establishment of such basis.  
 
Existing legislation hindering application in Finland: N/A  
 
Administrative burden: Some increase in administrative requirements is likely, resources 
are needed to administrate the permitting process, and coordinate and carry out the 
inspections. 
 
Requirements for public funding: Likely to require public funding to cover start-up costs, 
however, as in Oregon, the private funding obtained from permit fees should be able to 
cover costs in the long run. 
 
Acceptability / legitimacy: Keeping permit fees low is likely to increase legitimacy among 
stakeholders whereas the promise of limited public funding should increase political 
support. However, it is also possible that the boat owners in Finland will, as a matter of 
principle, object to such a fee and consider that it interferes with the ‘freedom of boating’. 
For example, boats can be used without acquiring an official driving licence and also the 
limit for driving under the influence of alcohol is more relaxed for boating than driving. This 
means that boating is a more ‘official-free’ zone in Finland and any fee on it is likely to raise 
objections. 
 
→ Permit programme(s) similar to Oregon and Idaho could play role in implementing IAS 
policy in Finland. However, the coverage of such permit programmes would be rather 
limited as there are currently only a few IAS spreading via boats between inland waters or 
between inland water and the Baltic Sea. Furthermore, it may be that the acceptability of 
such a fee among key stakeholders would be low. 
 
6.5 Key references 
 
Aquatic Invasive Species Permit Programme, 
http://www.oregon.gov/osmb/clean/pages/aisppfaqspage.aspx#About_the_Aquatic_Invasi
ve_Species_Permit_Program_%28AISPP%29  
  
Aquatic Invasive Species Permit Programme Programme Report 2012,  
http://www.oregon.gov/OSMB/Clean/docs/AISPP2012AnnualReportFinal.pdf  
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Idaho’s Invasive Species Council, Invasive Species Program, 
http://www.agri.idaho.gov/Categories/Environment/InvasiveSpeciesCouncil/indexInvSpCou
ncil.php  
 
Personal communication with experts: Glenn Dolphin, Aquatic Invasive Species Coordinator, 
Oregon State Marine Board  
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7 Economic incentive based on encouraging low risk behaviour 
via lower costs of inspection and sampling, Australia 
Instrument in a nutshell: The instrument works through setting lower inspection and 
sampling costs to those agents that utilise low-risk pathways in their import activities. 
 
Type of instrument: economic incentive based on the avoidance of risk-based costs 
 
Participation: obligatory 
 
Source of funding: private 
 
Focus in terms of hierarchical approach to IAS: prevention (unintentional) 
 
Scale of application: national 
 
Current status: ongoing 
 
7.1 Description of mechanism 
 
In Australia, the process of quarantine inspections has been established to monitor different 
pathways of commodity imports with a view to detect possible IAS contamination. Once 
identified, contaminated pathways can be mitigated against IAS occurrence, helping to 
safeguard Australia’s biosecurity status.  
 
Information on inspection history (i.e. information on contaminated and ‘safe’ pathways) is 
used to identify pathways with high risk for unintentional introductions. During the past few 
years, the Australian Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Centre of Excellence for 
Biosecurity Risk Analysis (CEBRA) have also trialled a system for identifying low-risk product 
pathways.  
 
The information on high and low risk pathways can be used to ensure that inspection 
regimes and resourcing are allocated according to a commodity's risk profile and pathway 
failure rate. In short, the attempt is to target quarantine inspection resources towards 
pathways that statistically present higher risks. Based on the results of the trial carried out 
in 2008, of 10 pathways examined 7 were found to be low risk. 
 
The identification of high and low risk pathways is based on an algorithm called Continuous 
Sampling Plans (CSP).  The algorithm works by looking at the history of a certain pathway: 
the more incidents of contamination a pathway has the more likely it is to receive attention 
from quarantine inspectors. Similarly, the lack of data for a pathway, reflecting high level of 
uncertainty, triggers inspections.  
 
From the perspective of importers, the pathway risk analysis results in creating an economic 
incentive for responsible ‘importer behaviour’ and selecting for low-risk pathways. This is 
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because inspection intensity will be lowered on low-risk pathways meaning that products 
reach the market faster, rather than being held at a quarantine facility. The likelihood for 
losing goods and related revenue due to sampling is also lower when using low-risk 
pathways. Building on the above, importers have an incentive to look for relatively safe 
commodities and pathways, enforcing low-risk behaviour. Furthermore, by not creating 
contamination incidents over time the importers can improve their rating with the 
inspection authorities, further minimising their costs related to inspection and sampling.  
Consequently, in the long term the pathway risk analysis is foreseen to reward good 
performance and result in a change in risk behaviour. 
 
7.2 Experience of effectiveness 
 
Evidence shows the changes implemented have led to improvements to cargo systems at 
the border. A study of cargo data showed that in 2008 – 2009 and 2011 – 2012 non-
compliance rates decreased 36% for air cargo and 10% for sea cargo, despite increases in 
cargo volumes. 
 
From the perspective of the importer, the median arrival-to-release time decreased by 84% 
for air cargo and 15% for sea cargo. Compliant cargo was processed significantly more 
quickly (1.2 hours for air cargo and 0.7 days for sea cargo) than non-compliant cargo (122 
hours for air cargo and 11 days for sea cargo). This shows that where clients appropriately 
manage risks they can expect to save both time and money. 
 
To conclude, there is no direct conclusive evidence on how the instrument has affected the 
overall risk of species invasions. However, it seems to have increased the rate of compliance 
- which can be considered as an indirect indicator for reduced invasion risk - and reduced 
the costs related to prevention. 
 
7.3 Assessment of pros and cons 
 
Coverage: Relatively high. Systematically addressed all key pathways for unintentional IAS 
introduction at national level, encouraging where possible the use of low-risk pathways (i.e. 
low-risk imports) and allowing authorities to focus more inspection effort and resources on 
high-risk pathways.  
 
Cost-effectiveness: Relatively high. Targeting prevention in a successful manner can be 
considered as one of the most cost-effective means to address IAS problems. The data 
(above) confirms the predicted decrease in non-compliance and increase in low-risk 
behaviour, including increasing economic rationale to opt for low-risk pathways. 
 
Legislative requirements: Required. An elaborated system of inspection and sampling, and 
related monitoring and analysis is possible due to the high importance given to IAS issues in 
Australia, including a comprehensive legislative basis.  
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Administrative burden: Low additional burden. Established border control / check systems 
for imports, as well as monitoring and statistics of pathways, are required. However, these 
systems already exist; the pathway risk analysis results only in reallocation of the existing 
resources and administrative burden according to the identified high-risk areas. 
 
Requirements for (additional) public funding: Low additional funding.  Established border 
control and monitoring systems for imports requires public funding. However, pathway risk 
analysis does not introduce new requirements for public funding. Furthermore, increased 
effectiveness might in the long-run even reduce funding requirements. 
 
Acceptability / legitimacy: Relatively high. The acceptability of pathway controls based on 
pathway risk analysis is likely to be high as the system relies on cost avoidance, rather than 
creating additional fees and costs.  
 
Links to addressing fundamental aspects of IAS problem: In a long run, the application of 
the mechanism results in low-risk behaviour among importers, this way raising awareness 
and successfully addressing one of the underlying factors for unintentional introductions.  
 
7.4 Assessment of applicability in Finland 
 
Required legislative support: Encouraging low risk behaviour in similar manner as in 
Australia would require the development of a comprehensive IAS pathway control 
framework for Finland, including legislative basis for its establishment. Integration of the 
upcoming EU Regulation on IAS into national legislation could facilitate the establishment of 
such basis.  
 
Existing legislation hindering application in Finland: The mechanism is related to trade 
pathways, therefore there might be some complications regarding regulations for intra-EU 
trade that need to be clarified. 
 
Administrative burden: Likely to require considerable new administrative resources. This is 
because requires the establishment of a comprehensive system for IAS pathway control in 
Finland, beyond plant and animal pests. However, more detailed and realistic conclusions 
on the foreseen additional administrative burden require a dedicated assessment of the 
current level of administrative resources used for pest border control.  
 
Requirements for public funding: Likely to require significant public funding to establish a 
comprehensive system for IAS pathway control. However, when such a system has been 
established the low risk analysis itself is not foreseen to require a significant amount of 
additional sources. However, more detailed and realistic conclusions on the foreseen 
additional funding require a dedicated assessment of current level of funding used for pest 
border control. 
 
Acceptability / legitimacy: There is no existing overarching framework for IAS pathway 
control in Finland and the development of such system is foreseen to require quite a and a 
significant amount of resources are required. Therefore it is likely that ensuring the 
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acceptability of such framework requires further work (e.g. awareness raising) and policy 
development (e.g. adoption of the EU IAS Regulation). However, when the pathway control 
framework is established, the low risk measure does not result in further additional burden 
or costs to importers and, in addition, it should provide the importers of low-risk products 
economic benefits in long-term.  
 
→ Using economic rationale to encourage low risk behaviour, as in Australia, does not seem 
a feasible option for Finland in the immediate future. This is because such a mechanism 
builds on an existing comprehensive framework for IAS pathway control. However, the 
mechanism could be considered in the future when the national regulative framework for 
IAS pathways becomes further developed. 
 
7.5 Key references 
 
AQIS Quarantine Operations Risk Return ACERA 1001 Study J Imported Plant-Product 
Pathways. Final Report (2012), 
http://www.acera.unimelb.edu.au/materials/endorsed/1001j.pdf 
 
DAFF Annual Report 2012-2013, http://www.daff.gov.au/about/annualreport/2012-13 
 
Daff Annual Report 2012-2013 (Part 3) Report on performance (96), 
http://www.daff.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0020/2351513/part3-report-
performance.pdf 
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8 Liability-based fines related to non-compliance, the UK 
Instrument in a nutshell: The instruments collect funding in the form of fines and other 
payments from parties that have breached some IAS-related regulation. These fines or 
payments are intended to provide incentives to comply with the regulations (i.e. desired 
way of action). 
 
Type of instrument: liability-based fines and payments related to non-compliance 
 
Participation: obligatory 
 
Source of funding: private 
 
Focus in terms of hierarchical approach to IAS: prevention and control (deliberate release), 
restoration  
 
Scale of application: national 
 
Current status: ongoing 
 
8.1 Description of mechanism 
 
Several EU Member States have implemented legal instruments that allow them to impose 
fines and/or criminal proceedings against individuals or groups who deliberately or through 
negligence release IAS into the wild.  The instruments are designed as deterrents, used as a 
last resort in particularly clear and damaging cases, and not as cost-recovery mechanisms, 
but in some cases they allow the recovery of some costs.  
 
In the UK, it is illegal to release or allow the escape into the wild of any non-native and non-
resident animal, or any plant, fungal or algal species specifically listed in the legislation. This 
is considered to pertain only to natural or semi-natural habitats but should be judged on a 
case-by-case basis (Defra 2010).  In England and Wales, offences can be penalised with a 
£5000 fine and/or a 6 month imprisonment. In Northern Ireland, there is no upper limit to 
sanctions.  
 
Similar fees can also be applied to the accidental release of IAS or control of already 
established IAS. In Germany, it is illegal to release or allow to escape into nature (‘freie 
Natur’) any non-native invasive species (with exemptions for agricultural, forestry, fishing 
and hunting purposes). Federal states can enact laws allowing species control orders (BfN 
2010). A fine of up to 10 000 Euro can be applied, and federal states have the freedom to 
implement further sanctions if they wish. In Denmark a Statutory order on eradication of 
giant hogweed adopted in 2009 (Stat. Order No. 862 of 10.09.2009) stipulates that the 
municipality can impose orders on owners or users of areas (including public agencies) to 
eradicate the plant from their land. This obligation is subject to the existence of a dedicated 
action plan for Giant hogweed, outlining agreed requirements for its management and 
control. As an outcome, the eradication should lead to the extinction of the plant in the area 
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in question while also preventing further reproduction. Failure to comply with an order to 
carry out eradication is punishable by a fine. 
 
8.2 Experience of effectiveness 
 
Limited information was available in the public domain to draw general conclusions on 
effectiveness. Consequently, the conclusions are based on information from the UK 
(including an expert interview). 
 
In the UK, the public authorities can currently only impose a fine on a landowner (or other 
operator) through a legal prosecution. Legal prosecutions are difficult to win in court 
because of the need to prove liability and/or causality, and so far there have been none in 
England (pers comm Dr Edward Blane, Natural England). In England (UK) there are 
numerous barriers to the use of legal prosecutions (pers comm Dr Edward Blane, Natural 
England): for most species, it is not illegal to sell, advertise or supply the species, only to 
release it; it is very difficult or impossible to get enough evidence to connect the release of a 
species to a particular person, and any damage caused may come years or decades after the 
release; there is often a lack of evidence to pinpoint the genetic identity of the animals or 
plants being released and a lack of legal clarity regarding subspecies or races; and illegal 
releases are rarely reported to the authorities.  
 
Many players are involved in alien species supply/import chains and enforcement of 
regulations, and this hinders coordination. An illustrative example is given by the difficulty 
of regulating the importation of non-native bumblebees in England (which are currently 
imported as Balkan and German subspecies that differ genetically from the British wild 
species).  Importation is controlled by the Animal Health agency in conjunction with the 
National Bee Unit, but any breaches of the import regulations are enforced by Council 
Trading Standards; their release is licensed by Natural England, but any illegal release is 
enforced by the police; whilst their disposal at the end of use is regulated by Animal Health, 
but again enforced by local councils.  
 
8.3 Assessment of pros and cons 
 
Coverage: Moderate - relatively low. Legal provisions usually only cover a limited list of 
species, and it may be very difficult to update the list flexibly to allow legal action to control 
new problematic species. For example, the UK law covers all alien animals, as well as 
specifically listed species, but only covers those plant, fungal or algal species that are listed 
in the legislation. This currently includes some 26 plant, fungal or algal species (compared to 
the more than 1400 alien species recorded in the UK) (Roy et al 2010). The revision of this 
list is currently only possible through a legislative act, which is a barrier to extending the 
coverage because of the long process; however the list was revised in 2010 in each region 
(England, Scotland, Wales, N Ireland) (Law Commission 2012).  
 
Cost-effectiveness: Moderate - relatively low.  The overall cost-effectiveness depends on 
the ratio between the size of the fine and the costs of required action, i.e. if the fine is 
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significantly lower than the costs of required action then the stakeholders might 
deliberately opt to pay the fee rather than support the implementation of the primary 
measure. The likelihood of being found guilty for breaching a regulation also affects the 
effectiveness of fines. This is clearly linked to the availability of resources to monitor 
compliance. Furthermore, cost-effectiveness also depends on the ratio between the size of 
fine and costs of surveillance, i.e. if detecting and/or demonstrating non-compliance 
requires significant efforts - such as in the case of the UK, where fines can only be issued 
through a legal prosecution - then the fine might not be able to offset the related costs.  
 
Legal provisions are generally not designed – nor considered - as a cost-recovery 
mechanism. In the UK, legal procedures for wildlife crime can cost more than the fine, so it 
is likely that any court cases on behalf of the authorities to establish liability would not be 
cost-effective (Law Commission 2014). If a fine is imposed by a legal prosecution, the money 
goes into the government Treasury and is not specifically allocated to nature conservation 
or to the control of invasive alien species. 
 
A review of the UK legislation recommends that it should include the possibility of a range of 
civil sanctions (Law Commission 2014). This would allow the regulators to issue fixed 
monetary penalties, discretionary requirements, or stop notices, and to accept enforcement 
undertakings, as alternatives to criminal prosecutions. The financial income from fines could 
contribute to the recovery of administrative costs.  
 
Legislative requirements: Required. Legislative requirements form the basis for fines on 
non-compliance. Furthermore, additional legislative requirements can enhance control and 
prevention of impacts. For example, in the UK it is illegal to dispose of certain invasive non-
native species in waste without notification and proper measures, also punishable by fine 
and/or imprisonment. Costs incurred in removing illegally deposited IAS waste (Japanese 
knotweed) or in reducing the damage associated with the disposal can be recovered. Soil 
from contaminated sites is regulated as controlled waste and its disposal is subject to 
regulatory safeguards and volume-based charging.  
 
Administrative burden: Relatively high. Enforcement of the legislation requires well-trained 
public staff time and public funding to investigate infringements.  
 
Requirements for public funding: Relatively high. Enforcement of the legislation requires 
well-trained public staff time and public funding to investigate infringements. 
 
Acceptability / legitimacy: Moderate. Liability based fees build on the polluter pays 
principle and therefore they are generally well accepted by decision-makers and the general 
public.  However, if the level of fee is very low it might simply be treated as ‘a license for 
non-compliance’ by the stakeholders in question.  
 
Links to addressing fundamental aspects of IAS problem: The enforcement of legal 
sanctions supports awareness raising because of the need to inform affected parties of their 
legal obligations and the consequences. There is less evidence of the effectiveness of legal 
provisions as a deterrent to the introduction and release of invasive alien species. 
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8.4 Assessment of applicability in Finland 
 
Required legislative support: As elsewhere, the establishment of non-compliance related 
fees is foreseen to require a legislative instrument. 
 
Existing legislation hindering application in Finland: N/A 
 
Administrative burden: The requirements for (additional) administrative burden depend on 
the scope of the fee and already existing framework. If the non-compliance fees were 
focused on certain high priority IAS only then the administrative requirements could be 
relatively limited. However, non-compliance fees related to the overall intentional 
introduction of IAS (e.g. as in the UK) requires the development of a more comprehensive 
national framework for such introductions. Finally, the administrative burden is determined 
by the procedure required for demonstrating liability: civil sanctions by regulating bodies 
(such as the Finnish ELY-centres) are likely to be less burdensome than a legislative 
procedure. 
 
Requirements for public funding: The requirements for (additional) public funding depend 
on the scope of the fee. Requirements for (additional) public funding are limited when the 
fee is focused on a certain IAS only (e.g. covering costs of targeted inspections). Non-
compliance payments related to the overall intentional introduction of IAS require the 
development of a more comprehensive national framework with requirements for 
additional public funding. Finally, fees based on civil sanctions by regulating bodies (such as 
the Finnish ELY-centres) are likely to be less costly than legislative procedures. 
 
Acceptability / legitimacy: Payments related to non-compliance are based on the polluter 
pays principle and therefore they should be generally acceptable also in Finland.  
 
→ Non-compliance related fees, targeting either a group of or certain specific IAS, could be 
a possible IAS policy measure in Finland. Similar payments are already used in the context of 
animal health management and they could provide a basis for extending the mechanism to 
a broader group of IAS.  
 
It is highly likely that non-compliance related fees will be required in the future when 
establishing national prevention and control measures for all species identified as ‘IAS of 
Union concern’ under the EU Regulation. 
 
8.5 Key references 
 
BfN (2010) Vollzugshinweise zum Artenschutzrecht. Vom staendigen Ausschuss ‘Arten und 
Biotopschutz’ ueberarbeitet (Stand: 19.11.2010). Bundesamt fuer Naturschutz. 
http://www.bfn.de/fileadmin/MDB/documents/themen/cites/Vollzugshinweise.pdf 
  
Defra (2010) Guidance on section 14 of the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981. Defra, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/preventing-the-release-into-the-wild-of-
certain-plants-and-animals-guidance  
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Environment Agency (2012) The knotweed code of practice. Environment Agency UK, 
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Law Commission (2012) Impact assessment of UK wildlife law. UK Law Commission & Defra, 
http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/areas/wildlife.htm  
 
Law Commission (2014) Wildlife Law: Control of invasive non-native species. LAW COM No 
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Environmental Protection Act 1990, Section 34. 
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https://www.retsinformation.dk/Forms/R0710.aspx?id=127156 
Roy H. et al (2012) Non-Native Species in Great Britain: establishment, detection and 
reporting to inform effective decision making. Report for Defra. Centre for Ecology & 
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of the British Isles.  Available at, http://www.nonnativespecies.org/index.cfm?pageid=175  
 
Contact: Dr. Edward Blane, Natural England, interview 18 December 2013  
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9 Public procurement as a market-based mechanism supporting 
IAS policy action 
Instrument in a nutshell: Obligatory requirements or voluntary guidelines and codes of 
conduct that restrict or guide the procurement activities of public bodies (cities, local 
authorities etc.). The aim is to encourage the use of native species instead of non-native 
species in order to limit the risk of IAS invasions or restrict the spread of already established 
species. 
 
Type of instrument: public procurement as a means for reducing the risk of spread 
 
Participation: voluntary  
 
Source of funding: private and public 
 
Focus in terms of hierarchical approach to IAS: prevention (intentional) 
 
Scale of application: regional 
 
Current status: ongoing 
 
9.1 Description of mechanism 
 
Public procurement may involve the purchase and release of IAS, for example through the 
management of public green spaces. The European Commission recommends that public 
procurement contracts oblige the contractor to report the presence of any invasive alien 
species on managed areas, and to dispose of waste with IAS material correctly (EC 2011). 
However, there are few examples of IAS being taken into account in public procurement. 
Although the new EU public procurement directive includes measures to include 
environmental issues in public procurement, the accompanying handbook on green public 
procurement does not mention invasive alien species (European Commission 2013).  
 
A few Member States have implemented binding rules on public procurement on IAS which 
public organisations and service contracts must follow. Most Member States rely on 
voluntary guidelines or codes of conduct on IAS. For example, a 2011 survey of the 
European code of conduct on IAS for the horticulture sector found national initiatives either 
on-going or planned in 10 Member States (BE,DK,EE,IE,NL,PO,SK,SI,ES,UK); however not all 
of these target the public sector as well as private retailers (EPPO 2011a). 
 
The Government of the Walloon Region (Belgium) has issued a dedicated IAS Circular that 
builds on its social and environmental public procurement plan and applies to all public 
authorities within their area of competence since 2009 (Wallonie 2013). This specifies that 
all public procurement contracts (cahiers spéciaux des charges) involving the supply or use 
of animal and plant species must prohibit any intentional introduction of specific IAS. The 
2012 version refers to the IAS listed in the Belgian Code of Conduct on invasive alien species, 
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thereby linking the obligatory Circular with use of the voluntary Code. Users of the Code are 
asked to sign up online and commit voluntarily to not selling or planting any species listed in 
the code, disseminate information, and report IAS occurrences.  
 
In the UK, all products and services procured by public authorities should comply with the 
Horticulture Code of Practice covering invasive non-native plants (England and Wales) or the 
Code of practice on non-native species (Scotland) (Defra 2011; Scottish Government 2012). 
Failure to comply with the code is not an offence, but compliance with the code is 
considered to play a role as evidence in the case of a prosecution. The code covers 
compliance with the Wildlife and Countryside Action 1981, which makes it illegal to plant or 
propagate certain listed plants, but goes further by listing good practices and referring users 
to the national non-native species database, which provides information on all known 
invasive alien species in the UK.  
 
In Ireland, the statutory nature conservation organisations led the publication of a code of 
conduct on horticulture in 2008 (Kelly 2012), which is targeted at the public bodies in 
Ireland as well as at private retailers and citizens. The code is now being promoted in a 
public awareness campaign based on a previously successful UK campaign (Invasive Species 
Ireland website).  
 
9.2 Experience of effectiveness 
 
Limited information was available in the public domain to draw general conclusions on 
effectiveness. 
 
According to the national experts, in Belgium the Circular in Wallonia is generally respected 
by public authorities, but it only applies to federal and regional government, not to 
municipalities and local government (M Halford pers. comm.). The voluntary Code of 
Conduct on IAS in the horticultural sector on the other hand has become well known. 
Currently 150 municipalities (out of 589 altogether) have adopted it (M Halford pers. 
comm.). It is well supported because it was developed in consultation with and then 
approved by the main horticultural associations at the national level, and has been made 
easy to adopt (AlterIAS 2011). A LIFE project (LIFE08 INF/B/000052) focussed on increasing 
awareness of the Code succeeded in achieving a very high rate of awareness amongst public 
green space managers but only a 35% adoption rate of the code of conduct by 2013, 
indicating the need for long-term promotion (Halford et al 2013). In addition Belgium has 
IAS alert lists available online (Harmonia online database). 
 
9.3 Assessment of pros and cons 
 
Coverage: Relatively low. Public procurement is not one of the major pathways for IAS. In 
practice, it is limited to non-native plants only (i.e. public green spaces). Therefore, even 
though the mechanism can be used to prevent both entry and further spread of IAS its 
scope remains rather limited.  
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Voluntary codes of conduct have the advantage that they can be promoted at the national 
and regional level without the need for legislation or political implementation, which can be 
complicated, particularly in federal governance systems. In contrast, the impact of public 
procurement legislation is limited as national-level legislation does not always apply to local 
authorities, whereas most public procurement potentially involving IAS takes place at the 
municipal and local authority level rather than directly by national government. 
 
Public procurement rules or guidance may be based either on a list of recommended 
native/non-invasive species or on the exclusion of a black-list. However, the impact of 
voluntary codes is often limited because they only refer to a selective list of species, due to 
the need to achieve consensus and acceptance within the sector.  
 
Cost-effectiveness: Relatively high - Moderate. The cost-effectiveness of public 
procurement rules / guidance depends on the scope and mode of implementation. In 
principle, compulsory procurement results in a broad and immediate uptake, however 
ensuring effective implementation in practice requires enforcement (including resources for 
enforcement). Costs related to the implementation of voluntary codes and guidelines are 
rather low and therefore, when successful, such measures can be very cost-effective. 
However, voluntary measures always run the risk of being perceived as ineffective because 
of the lack of sanctions on non-adopters.  Voluntary procurement guidance generally 
requires a large communication campaign to secure a successful update. For example, in 
Belgium this was achieved with LIFE funding. However, stakeholders often have a higher 
acceptance of voluntary codes, particularly if they were involved in their development, and 
are therefore more willing to contribute to their promotion and implementation. 
 
Legislative requirements: Not required. Legislative basis is not required for voluntary codes. 
Ideally, however, the voluntary code should be linked to the legislative framework (see cost-
effectiveness above). 
 
Administrative burden: Relatively low - Moderate. Public administrations will initially be 
required to make additional efforts to promote and enforce the public procurement rules, 
but once these are established there is no additional administrative burden. Voluntary 
codes are also relatively quick to implement and to revise in order to respond to new risks 
compared to legislation.  
 
Requirements for public funding: Relatively low - Moderate. Public procurement rules or 
guidance do not require any additional direct funding for their implementation; however, 
some additional resources are required to promote the guidance to contractors and to 
monitor and enforce its implementation in public procurement contracts. 
 
Acceptability / legitimacy: Relatively high - Moderate. Voluntary codes may be positively 
regarded by stakeholders who are resistant to increased regulation. In general, stakeholders 
often have a higher acceptance of voluntary codes, particularly if they were involved in their 
development, and are therefore more willing to contribute to their promotion and 
implementation. However, public procurement based only on voluntary measures runs the 
risk of being perceived as ineffective because of the lack of sanctions on non-adopters. 
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Links to addressing fundamental aspects of IAS problem: Public procurement rules / 
guidance can address both the prevention and control of IAS. A large proportion of urban 
green spaces are managed by the public sector, and effective public procurement rules 
regarding the use of IAS could potentially have an impact on limiting the introduction and 
spread of invasive alien horticultural species particularly in urban areas.  In terms of 
awareness rising, public green spaces also play an important role by setting an example of 
what can be achieved through the use of native and non-invasive species, thus influencing 
the behaviour of private gardeners and land managers.  
 
9.4 Assessment of applicability in Finland 
 
Required legislative support: No legislative support required and voluntary codes of 
conduct or guidelines can be adopted immediately. However, establishing a legislative basis 
for public procurement is commonly regarded as increasing the effectiveness of 
implementation. 
 
Existing legislation hindering application in Finland: N/A 
 
Administrative burden: Depends on the mode of implementation. The adoption and 
implementation of obligatory provisions for public procurement - especially monitoring the 
compliance with the provisions – is likely to require some additional administrative input. 
However, the voluntary codes of conduct can be adopted with very limited or no 
administrative involvement. 
 
Requirements for public funding: Depends on the mode of implementation. The adoption 
and implementation of obligatory provisions for public procurement requires some 
additional funding, e.g. to cover the costs of monitoring. Voluntary codes of conduct can in 
principle be adopted with very limited costs, however some public resources are required to 
promote the guidance to contractors and to monitor and enforce its implementation in 
public procurement contracts. 
 
Acceptability / legitimacy: Depends on the mode of implementation. The acceptability is 
likely to be high for voluntary codes of conduct but perhaps more difficult for establishing 
obligatory procurement rules. 
 
→ Establishing voluntary codes of conduct for public procurement could be a possible IAS 
policy measure in Finland both at national, regional and local level. In addition to a national 
initiative such codes could also be adopted ‘bottom-up’ by pro-active regions and cities. 
Voluntary codes could then pave the way towards a more binding public procurement rules, 
linked with the foreseen implementation of the EU IAS Regulation. 
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10 Taxes earmarked to support IAS management, Hawaii (the US) 
Instrument in a nutshell: The instrument works by collecting funding for IAS management 
through conveyance taxes 
 
Type of instrument: tax payments earmarked to IAS  
 
Participation: obligatory 
 
Source of funding: public 
 
Focus in terms of hierarchical approach to IAS: varying focus, depending on the use 
 
Scale of application: national / regional (state) 
 
Current status: ongoing  
 
10.1 Description of mechanism 
 
In Hawaii (US), a proportion of the conveyance tax on certain real estate transactions is 
earmarked to be paid into the Natural Area Reserve Fund (NARF), a funding instrument 
dedicated to support the conservation of specific land and water areas important to both 
biodiversity and local communities. This arrangement is based on the general understanding 
that the development, sale, and improvement of real estate in Hawaii adds additional 
pressure on natural areas, coastal access, agricultural production, and Hawaii's water 
resources and watershed recharge areas. Therefore, there is a link between the source of 
the conveyance tax and providing funding for watershed protection and other natural 
resource preservation programmes.  
 
Financing the control of invasive alien species in Hawaii, especially with links to watershed 
protection, falls within the dedicated scope of NARF. Since its establishment in 2005, the 
Hawaii Invasive Species Council (HISC), i.e. the organisation responsible for disbursing funds 
for IAS related projects, has received part of its budget from the fund. Through HISC a part 
of the funding is distributed to Hawaii's Invasive Species Committees that are responsible 
for controlling incipient weeds. A part of the funds is taken up by the Watershed 
Partnerships Program to control weeds that are already established that can no longer be 
eradicated. The Watershed Partnership Programme also carries out biocontrol projects for 
priority weed species that have the potential to modify habitats or reduce groundwater 
infiltration. 
 
Since 1992 NARF has been receiving 25% of the Conveyance tax, except for the period of 
2008-2012 when it received 20%.  
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10.2 Experience of effectiveness 
 
No quantitative information is available on the effectiveness of the instrument. However, 
according to a national expert the conveyance tax has been an effective mechanism for 
providing long-term funding for invasive species control under Hawaii's watershed 
partnerships.  
 
The negative side of using the conveyance tax mechanism is that it is sensitive to economic 
fluctuations. When the economy is in recession real estate prices and sales decline resulting 
in a decline in funding for invasive species control as this occurred in 2009-2012. During the 
period of recession, the Hawaii State legislature also reduced the percentage of the tax 
supporting NARF, utilising the fund instead to make up shortages in the state general fund.  
 
10.3 Assessment of pros and cons 
 
Coverage: Relatively high – relatively low. Coverage depends on the amount of tax and the 
use of funds: in principle, the tax earmarked to support IAS policy action can be targeted to 
any specific IAS group, pathway or measure. In Hawaii, the mechanism is used to fund 
different IAS projects and also to support the functioning of the Hawaii Invasive Species 
Council. Since IAS are only one of the NARF focal areas not all of the 25% earmarked tax is 
used to support the implementation of IAS policy. Therefore, in the case of Hawaii the 
coverage of the mechanism is likely to be rather limited.  
  
Cost-effectiveness: Relatively high - Moderate. The overall cost-effectiveness of the 
earmarked tax depends on its use, e.g. whether it is used for preventative measures or 
control of already established species. In general, if a tax is set at a very low level it is 
unlikely to function as a means to reduce risk behaviour contributing to (further) spread of 
an invasive species. 
 
Legislative requirements: Required. The percentage of earmarked tax is integrated in the 
regulation. 
 
Administrative burden: Low. There are no significant administrative requirements beyond 
the administration of the funds collected (e.g. allocation of funding to projects and central 
administration of project cycles). 
 
Requirements for public funding: Relatively low. There is no need for significant new public 
funding beyond the administration of the funding collected via tax. 
 
Acceptability / legitimacy: Relatively high - Moderate. The acceptability and legitimacy 
depend on the link between the overall / specific IAS problem and the taxed sector (e.g. in 
the case of Hawaii the negative impacts of the real estate sector to watershed recharge 
areas). Furthermore, the acceptability is affected by how well the relevant stakeholders 
understand and appreciate this linkage. 
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Links to addressing fundamental aspects of IAS problem: Earmarked tax payments can 
support awareness-raising among the tax-paying stakeholders. However, this also depends 
on how well the purpose of earmarking is communicated.  
 
10.4 Assessment of applicability in Finland 
 
Required legislative support: Earmarking (real estate) tax in a similar manner as in Hawaii 
would require a legislative basis.  
 
Existing legislation hindering application in Finland: N/A  
 
Administrative burden: Additional administrative burden is likely to be limited. The system 
of earmarked tax does not require specific administration and the funds collected could be 
administrated by the existing stakeholders (e.g. Ministries and/or regional environment 
administrators). 
 
Requirements for public funding: Additional public funding is likely to be limited (see 
above). 
 
Acceptability / legitimacy: Likely to depend on the sector targeted with earmarked tax and 
the ability to communicate / justify the link between IAS problem and taxed sector to 
affected stakeholders. These aspects might limit the applicability in Finland. 
 
→ Using earmarked tax to create funding for IAS policy implementation might not be a 
feasible option for Finland in the immediate future. This is because Finland does not have a 
very prominent culture of nature-related taxes and furthermore, unlike in Hawaii, issues 
related to IAS are still relatively new / not recognised as a key environmental problem by 
stakeholders. 
 
10.5 Key references 
 
Hawaii Senate Bill (CB1166) relating to the conveyance tax (2013), 
http://openstates.org/hi/bills/2013%20Regular%20Session/SB1166/documents/HID000501
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Hawaii Senate Bill (HB1308) (2005) establish Land Conservation Fund with permanent 
funding from the conveyance tax, http://www.hawaiiecoregionplan.info/HB1308_cd1_.html  
 
Hawaii Invasive Species Council – overview of funding, 
http://dlnr.hawaii.gov/hisc/projects/funding/  
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